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INTRODUCTION:
NEW APPEAL

In August of 2017, far right groups of the United States of America, such as the Proud
Boys, Christogenea, Vanguard America, and the Global Crusader Knights, among others, gathered
in an unprecedented fashion at Charlottesville, Virginia.1 These groups believed that they were
given the power to avert the changes of more liberal forces in the country. One of the organizers
of the event, Matthew Heimbach, wore a shirt depicting Corneliu Codreanu.2 Codreanu was the
charismatic founder, and to some extent heart and soul, of the Legion of the Archangel Michael
(LAM), or the Iron Guard, as it was frequently referred to in the English speaking world,the main
fascist force in Romanian politics during the interwar period. It also worth noting that, in 2019, a
London pro-fascist press retranslated and published Codreanu’s memoir, For My Legionnaires.
Finally, the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) party in Romania is gaining traction as a
party sympathetic to Legionary ideals, including ultranationalism.3 Why would a far-right activist
Bulent Kenes, “The Proud Boys: Chauvinist Poster Child of Far-Right Extremism,” n.d., 5; Emily Blout and Patrick
Burkart, “White Supremacist Terrorism in Charlottesville: Reconstructing ‘Unite the Right,’” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, January 4, 2021, 3–4, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1862850.
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August 15, 2017, https://balkaninsight.com/2017/08/15/romanian-fascism-inspires-us-white-nationalists-08-152017/.
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“The AUR and the Rise of Romanian Nationalism – a New Beginning or the Remnants of the Past?,” New Eastern
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in America be inclined to represent a Romanian fascist movement? Why is there demand for the
philosophy of the LAM in English? Why would now be the time for the LAM to make a
resurgence?

4

The LAM had many of the trappings of other Fascist movements, such as extreme
nationalism, anti-Semitism, a focus on racial politics and the desire to abolish Democracy.
However, the factor that may be the cause for the resurgence of the thought of the LAM is its
religiosity. Unlike the anti-clerical Nazis, and the state-spiritual Italians, the LAM was at its core,
a Christian movement, as the name may indicate. In this way, it was similar to the regime of

https://neweasterneurope.eu/2021/03/26/the-aur-and-the-rise-of-romanian-nationalism-a-new-beginning-or-theremnants-of-the-past/.
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Generalissimo Francisco Franco of Spain. However, the nationalism of the Romanian Orthodox
Church that supported the LAM may be the cause for this preference over the Catholicism of
Franco. This would likely be an important distinction, as the history of white supremacy in the
United States has largely been anti-Catholic as well. Further, the LAM proved to be highly antistatist in its approach, making it appealing to those who may be opposed to the current
establishment, but not thinking or caring about what comes next. Therefore, with these ideas in
mind, it is possible that the LAM was a more “exportable” version of Fascism, compared to many
of the other varieties. Even though the LAM was a nationalist group, its focus on a nationalist
religion helped make the ideas of the Legion more appealing to those abroad then if it was just
focused on nationalism. For the English-speaking world, this is what is truly appealing, God and
state, not the Romanian nation or race.
However, the Legion was a highly disorganized and violent group. It could be said that the
first goal of the LAM was not so much the betterment of Romania as it was the removal of Jews.
Between claims of the Jewish population of Romania existing for only 100 years, to outright
violence against Jews and those who were sympathetic to them, the LAM perpetuated a threat to
fellow members of the Romanian nation.5 Further, the group was far too unprofessional to be a
major player in politics. Political disorganization and the desire to make the politics of the LAM
the forefront of the daily life of the LAM made the entire system incapable of taking the power
that they truly wanted. The movement had opportunities to take control of Romania, but elected
not to take them, and when they did take overt action for power, they failed completely. This shows
the ineptitude and failure to seize opportunity among the LAM.

Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, For My Legionaries (London: Sanctuary Press, 2019), 384; “Slays Premier of
Rumania: Nazi Assassin Seized,” Chicago Daily Tribune (1923-1963); Chicago, Ill., December 30, 1933.
5
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Romania, like many European states, was not unified into a modern nation state until after
World War I. It was with the additions of the provinces of Banat, Bessarabia, Bucovina, Crisana,
Maramunes, and Transylvania that Romania contained all territories considered to have an ethnic
Romanian majority.6 After this union, and a number of major battles in the Great War, there was
a growing feeling of power and relevance for the average peasant, rather than just for the political
elite. Further advances in this growth of importance of citizens in government were the
introduction of universal male suffrage in 1918, and a new constitution that officially made
Romania a multiparty parliamentary monarchy.7 Treptow states
In the years immediately following the war, political observers were amazed at the
rapid transformation of the Romanian peasant; he was no longer the ‘poor
plowman’… but a citizen convinced that he truly represented the basis of the
country, having not only duties, but also rights that had to be satisfied by the state.8
The slow unification of the Romanian people was not just enjoyed by the rulers of
Romania, but in time even by the peasant in the field. Thus, in the wake of World War I,
the nation of Romania, experienced new power dynamics, from the demands of the average
citizen rather than from the powerful political elite. Young adults would likely be
especially motivated by this, coming of age just in time to make their mark on the nation’s
future. The dedication of the average person to the future of the country would become a
cornerstone of all further political developments in Romania, both democratic and fascist,
with the main distinction being what role the parliament would play in the future of

6

Kurt W. Treptow et al., A History of Romania, (Iasi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1997), 393)

Constantin Iordachi, “Country Report: Romania”, Cadmus.eui.edu, European University Institute, May 2010,
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19633/Romania.pdf?sequence=1, 3.
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Romania. The most notable new position in Romanian politics was that of the idea of the
peasant state, a government formed by, and led by and for the peasants of Romania.9
Of the three major political doctrines of the Romanian state, the liberal industrial
position was the one to receive the most support from the national government. The general
policy was one of focusing on domestic production and investment as much as possible.10
Thus, the ambition of the liberals was ultimately to defend Romania by transforming the
previously agrarian nation into an industrial power from the top down with governmental
policies. These policies proved to greatly increase the industrial capabilities of Romania,
as by 1938 was able to produce 80% of industrial products domestically, including a further
80% of agricultural equipment.11 However, as a result of the policy, foreign investment
drastically decreased, which severely hurt economic development between the wars,
although they surpassed many other nations in the region of Eastern Europe.12 A lack of
foreign investment was a radical shift from the finances of Romania before World War I.
Before the War, foreign investment amounted to roughly 80% of industrial production,
however, due to the liberal’s policies prioritizing the development of Romanian industry,
it represented only 37%. This rapid shift in investment was one of the principal reasons for
the economic lagging of Romania between the wars.13 In addition, this is likely a source
for the radicalization of the youth of Romania, as during their formative years, they would
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Keith Hitchins, A Concise History of Romania (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 165.

10

Treptow et al., 405

11

Treptow et al., 406

12

Treptow et al., 409-10

13

Treptow et al., 409

5

6
be exposed to contracdictory ideas of the nation’s great future, while living in an economic
crisis. This would be enough to drive many to more extreme political strategies.
Regardless, the political parties of Romania set in motion a great source of contention and
unrest through economic policy.
Among the political parties of the Romanian Parliament, the primary power in was
the National Liberal Party. The party had its first major successes in 1923, and continued
with intermittent success for more than a decade. Although on the whole it claimed to
support a democratic regime, it would prove to be more than willing to use military force
to silence protesters, and outlawed rival political parties, such as the Communist party in
1924.14 The People’s Party spawned from the People’s League, a movement lead by
General Alexandru Averescu, a national hero after the war, in 1920, and advocated for
economic rebuilding and agrarian reform. The Peasant’s Party likewise advocated for
agrarian reform, although also desired greater democratic reforms.15 With so many various
directions that the Romanian people were being pulled in, an excellent opportunity for a
charismatic party promising a bright future opened up.
While the power of the peasants began to grow, it was challenged by the elite, who
advocated for industrialization over the traditional agriculture of the past. The liberals were
opposed by a group of politicians, who believed that the future of Romania lay in scientific
agriculture and more limited industrial growth, known as Peasantists. Due to the vast
majority of Romania consisting of peasants, the Peasantists believed that united they could
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form a new type of government by attaining an overwhelming majority in parliament, a
peasant state founded on the interests of the basic Romanian farmer. It should be noted,
that despite their preference for the development of Romanian agriculture, the Peasantists
were not necessarily opposed to the development of the industry of Romania, only that
agriculture should be the primary focus of the nation’s economy. The Peasantists were also
notably in favor of keeping an open door for foreign investments, as they believed that
Romania lacked sufficient money to properly exploit all of its natural resources. This is in
stark contrast to the liberals that believed Romania must perform all exploitation of
resources on its own. The Peasant Party, and later the National Peasant Party, would best
represent the interests of the Peasantists.16
The final major non-nationalist political party of the Romanian state at the time was
the Social Democratic Party. These politicians were advocates of socialism, however, they
recognized Romania’s inability to achieve a truly socialist system at the time, due to its
lack of industrial progress. Thus, instead of focusing on directly making Romania a
socialist nation, they sought to first industrialize it as a capitalist nation, and convert it later
into a socialist state.17 This would allow Romania to develop and maintain the industrial
capacity for the socialist government programs. They also believed in the equality of all
citizens, and wanted to remove the perceived political and financial oligarchy of
Romania.18 With these three groups, Romania came to a crossroads on its future. Either it
could become the dominant exporter of grain in Europe or, as the liberals and social
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democrats believed, it could become a great industrial power. The very fate of Romania
was in the balance, and the loser of this battle would be forced to see Romania wallow in
wasted potential, in which ever field the victors decided. Even further, if the industrialists
were to win this battle, the argument of whether the state should embrace socialist ideals
would be on the horizon. For the Romanian citizen, the early 1920s were a time of great
chaos and excitement. With the power and desire to change the fate of the nation, and with
three directions for Romania to take, citizens appeared to have a bright, if undetermined
future ahead of them.
Another complex issue that unified many Romanians, while alienating others, was
religion. The primary religion of Romania in the time between the wars was the Romanian
Orthodox Church, which recently had the religious leader of Wallachia raised to the
position of patriarch, an extreme honor in the Orthodox tradition. This elevation of position
finalized the position of the Romanian church as an entity independent of the Greek
Orthodox Church.19 This would be a great boon for the nationalist movement of Romania,
that even their religion was becoming independent from outside influences at this exciting
new moment for Romania. However, this idea of the independence of the Romanian
Orthodox Church occurring in the wake of World War I is disputed. According to historians
Stan and Turcescu, the Romanian Orthodox Church truly had its origins in 1863, when
Alexandru Ioan Cuza made a number of sweeping reforms within the nation that separated
the Romanian Church from other Orthodox Churches. In addition to the Romanian
Orthodox Church, the Greek Catholic Church was also a recognized national religion, due

19

Treptow et al., 404
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to its establishment in the region in the seventeenth century.20 However, despite the
acceptance of the Greek Catholic Church, many nationalist intellectuals believed that one
of the marks of a true Romanian was the following of the Romanian Orthodox Church.21
Many nationalists latched onto this idea, and believed the Orthodox Church should be the
basis for the guiding principles of government.22 One of the major Romanian nationalists
who advocated for religious integration was a theologian named Nichifor Crainic. Crainic
was embraced by many nationalists and believed that Romania, with its uniquely Eastern
spirituality dating back to Pseudo-Dionysius, had a destiny to save Europe from spiritual
stagnation from the West.23 With the adoption of a religious component, Romanian
nationalism took on a new form, as well as allowing nationalists to exclude more people
from the definition of being a “good Romanian”, especially the Jews, who would be an
other for both ethnic and religious reasons. The Jews were victims of special ire, because
unlike the Germans and Hungarians who were members of neither national religion, they
were still Christian, and thus had some connection to the national churches of Romania.24
This would inevitably make the hatred of Jews among nationalists, and especially the
fascists who adopted this religious view, substantially stronger.
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One of the foremost problems of Romania at this time, like many European nations with
fascist movements, was anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism was not an oddity in Romania. In a study
of anti-Semitic acts across a number of countries, including Germany, France, and Italy, Romania
had the highest number of both ant-Semitic acts per million people, and the highest percentage of
anti-Semitic acts being violent in nature.25 Specifically, for every one million people in Romania,
between the years 1899-1939, .827 anti-Semitic instances occurred. Further, of these many
incidents, thirty four percent were violent in nature. While this is certainly not most people
committing acts of violence against Jews, this is still a significant statistic, with vast amounts of
violence against them. Many of the LAM’s members resented the Jewish people for their success.
One of the main reasons for this was the perception of them controlling more of the industry and
professions of Romania. Many Jewish communities were associated with commerce and were
located in more urban areas.26 Resentment over this perceived dominance of

Jews in the

professions was likely buttressed by the fact that about 16.4% of all university students from 1921
to 1933 were Jewish.27 For reference, Jews represented about 4% of the total population in
1930.28This resentment was compounded by a fact that was unique to the Jews among the various
ethnic groups of Romania, location. Most of the ethnic groups of Romania, like Germans and
Hungarians, were centered in specific regions of Romania, the Jews were dispersed throughout the
nation.29 The fact that there was a small group of people, of higher economic status spread across

William I. Brustein and Ryan D. King, “Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust,” International Political
Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 25, no. 1 (2004): 43.
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the country meant that there was a perceived artificial ceiling. Even if an individual were able to
leave their home and move from Iasi to Bucharest, the same general situation would remain. Thus,
many anti-Semitic Romanians thus felt that Jews had more wealth and status than the native born
and, in their view, rightful rulers of Romania should have. Those who thought this way were
incapable of escaping this, no matter where in their home country they went. When these factors
combined, it produced a synergistic understanding among many Romanians that the Jews had
found a place in society above them, as though they were second class citizens in their own
country. For anti-Semites, this problem was made worse by the Citizenship Law of 1924, which
was to naturalize minority populations, Jews included among them.30 This law was considered a
necessity due to the massive influx of new residents from the new territories acquired after the
war, and international political backlash from continued refusal of Jewish citizenship.31 These
feelings of resentment would bubble up in the form of virulent anti-Semitism, that would be one
of the major forces in the creation of national organizations for the protection of the interests of
the Romanian people, such as the LAM or the League of National Christian Defense (LANC).
One of the ideas that fanned the flame of anti-Semitism was the idea of a Jewish conspiracy
to take control of Romania. This conspiracy was not one of an external force, that would defeat
Romania from the outside, but a closely guarded secret within the nation’s very borders. Failure
to confront this conspiracy would result in the loss of sovereignty by Romanians to Jews, therefore
making the conspiracy a mortal danger in the eyes of the nationalist.32 The idea of the conspiracy
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Dragos Stoica, “Do Radicals Believe in their Mythologies? A Comparison Between the Muslim Brotherhood and
the Legion of the Archangel Michael in the Light of Four Political Mythologies.” Politics, Religion & Ideology, 15,
No. 1 (2014), 108-9
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came from the industries that were dominated by Jews. According to Codreanu, the fields of
literature, news, film, theater, and banking were all taken over by Jews, and used to corrupt the
soul of Romania.33 Some Legionaries even believed that the rise of democracy was part of the
Judeo-Masonic conspiracy, thus making an already unpalatable break from tradition all the more
corrupt.34 This accusation would help to connect far-right dissenters together against a scapegoat,
and help to turn those who were unsure of democracy away from it.
Given the events above, it appears natural that a fascist group, that exploited the youth and
was intrinsically bound to religion, emerged in Romania in the late 1920’s. While the LAM
certainly had its similarities to the Nazi party of Germany, its less effective use of political power
and personnel distinguished it, in addition to its use of Christianity. The use of one of the most
populous religions in the world is one of the reasons that the LAM has a longer longevity than its
low success rate would suggest. For this reason, it has seen recent resurgence among
ultranationalists in the United States and Europe.

33

Stoica, 109
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Stoica, 109.

12

CHAPTER ONE:
IDEAOLOGY OF THE IRON GUARD

Just after 10:00 PM, December 19, 1930, Sinaia, Romania. A distinguished man walks
through a crowd in the train station. Unbeknownst to him, a hateful enemy is among the throng,
looking for revenge. The quarry, Premier Ion G. Duca, is the head of the newly elected liberal
government of Romania, and has just finished up a meeting with a number of other political
figures, including the King of Romania himself. Informed that his train has been delayed, he arrives
late to the station. His stalker, Nicholas Constantinescu, is waiting for him, and is seeking
vengeance for the arrest of many of his political comrades and the outlawing of his party, the Iron
Guard. Perhaps most interesting about him though, is the fact that this was not a hardened,
experienced killer, but a young student. As Duca approaches a salon coach, a noise like thunder
rings out in the room, followed by three more. The crowd is thrown into disarray, confused by
what has happened. They realize just what occurred, when they view the corpse of the Premier
lying on the floor. This is when Constantinescu makes his escape. Though he wounds a police
prefect, ultimately, he is captured by police before the incensed crowd was able to have their own
bloody vengeance on the young assassin. With the premier of the nation dead, the newspapers
interview his assassin, utterly unrepentant of what he has done.35

35

“Slays Premier of Rumania: Nazi Assassin Seized.” Chicago Daily Tribune (1923-1963);
Chicago, Ill. December 30, 1933. 1.
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This assassination was the work of the Iron Guard. In Constantinescu’s account of the
assassination, he claimed that he murdered “Duca, friend of the Jews…in order to avenge the death
of my comrades in the Iron Guard who were killed in conflict with the gendarmery during the
recent anti-Semitic riots at Constantza.”36 While perhaps more brutal than the average event in the
history of the Iron Guard, this anecdote perfectly encapsulates the thought process and behavior
of the Iron Guard. This political organization was characterized by anti-Semitism and a lack of
organization and forethought in action. Brutish revenge assassinations like that of Duca’s were not
unheard of, and fits in with other acts of nearsighted violence and extreme escalation of the
organization. Despite this type of violence and reprisal, the organization found a strong niche in
Romanian society by its appeal to youth, and its culture of a belief in a greater meaning in what it
was doing.
The Iron Guard was founded as the Legion of the Archangel Michael (LAM) in a moment
of defiance from the established government, as many of its most defining moments would be. It
began amongst a group of roughly fifteen university students, each ambitious, politically minded,
and nursing a rabid hatred of the Jewish people. The group, led by a young man named Corneliu
Zelea Codreanu, broke away from a much larger group, known as the League of National Christian
Defense (LANC) in 1927. The students completely lacked any funds for a political organization,
they did not even have enough in the way for postage to tell their former comrades of their
departure.37 Then, in 1930, the
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LAM formed the Iron Guard as a paramilitary wing.38 Effectively this is the same organization,
though the term Iron Guard is more popular in the English-speaking world. However, regardless
of the difficulties that it would entail, such as government sanctioned killings, and fueled by hate
and the desire for the supremacy of the Romanian people, these young men strove to do what they
believed was right, for God and for country.39
The LANC was a critical organization in the foundation of fascism in Romania. Founded
in March 1923, the LANC was a product of two forces officially joining together. The first of these
forces was Alexandru C. Cuza, a professor of law at Iasi University. Cuza was notable at this time
for leading opposition to the presence
of Jews
in the law schools of Romania, and advocated for a numerus clausus.40 This is a limit of how
many Jews were able to be admitted into any given school based on their percentage of the
population.41 The force of this powerful, anti-Semitic personality melded well with the second
entity, that of an anti-Semitic student movement of 1922. This student movement was a group of
law students at Iasi university, who followed an expelled student, Corneliu Codreanu. Despite
Codreanu’s official expulsion, the law school of Iasi University continued to educate him, until his
graduation in 1922. In this period, Codreanu was able to establish a Christian student association,
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Roland Clark, Holy Legionary Youth: Fascist Activism in Interwar Romania (Cornell University Press, 2015),
100.
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Hitchins, A Concise History of Romania, 175.
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Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 19181930, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 265-6
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Roland Clark, Holy Legionary Youth: Fascist Activism in Interwar Romania, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
June 5, 2012), 28

16
which isolated the Jewish and leftist student societies. This student association also admired
Cuza’s anti-Semitic beliefs, and so eventually Cuza became the official leader of these students in
1923, when they founded the LANC.42 Once merged together, the LANC hosted many social
events, in addition to its attempts to break into parliament.43 These attempts eventually became
successful, after merging with two minor political parties.44 The time that Codreanu spent in the
LANC would not last forever however. In his own recollection of events, Codreanu believed that
the LANC was split into two separate factions, all as a result of the lack of leadership of Cuza.
According to Codreanu, small dissatisfactions with the leadership snowballed into growing
resentment, until several members of the league, including Codreanu’s father were expelled
without trial. It was from this schism and infighting that Codreanu took initiative and formed the
LAM with a small group of young students. 45
The goal of the Legion was initially fairly amorphous: to bring about a revolution in the
spirit of Romania, rather than in its political system. What this meant practically was a renunciation
of many of the popular currents that Romanian politicians were trying to convey. One of the
Legion’s greatest interests would be the rejection of the role that material wealth played in society,
as the Legion believed that what was important were matters of the spirit, such as honor and
virtue.46 This mindset put the Legion at odds with the liberals of the National Liberal Party, who
advocated for an increase in industrialization and the wealth associated with it, and the Social
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Democrats who desired industrialization in a socialist economic system.47 The Legion appealed to
those, especially the youth, who did not believe that the future of Romania lay in either a liberal
industrial state or that of a socialist state. Ultimately, the Legion advocated for modern industrial
technology, but without socialism or democracy.48 Although it is true that the Legion resented the
place of material wealth, they did not necessarily oppose its use or existence. In the words of
Codreanu himself, “We were not denying and will never deny the existence of matter in the world,
but did deny and forever will deny the right of its absolute domination.”49 The LAM and its
followers saw wealth merely as a means to an end, rather than a good in itself. The fact that the
LAM was not opposed to industry, while also promoting Romania’s agriculture, might have given
the appearance that it would have common ground with a third political party, the National
Peasants Party, but this was not the case, due to the Peasants party’s adherence to democracy and
liberties for all citizens.50
The LAM was at its core, an organization more founded in ideals than in plans. The goal
of the LAM was powerful and clear enough, but the membership did not have specific plans to
facilitate this change in idea. Codreanu asserted that “…it is not programs that we must have, but
men, new men. For such as people are today, formed by politicians and infected by the Judaic
influence, they will compromise the most brilliant political programs.”51 This indicates there was
little actionable plans being made to advance the goal of changing the culture of Romania, and
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implies a level of unprofessionalism and disorganization in the Legion. While it is natural for any
movement to not be highly organized or have an intricate plan at its inception, this was something
that Codreanu was boasting about in his memoir, about a decade after the founding of the
movement, and after it joined the political stage. These appear to be his thoughts at the time of the
publishing of the second edition of the book shortly before his death, so should be accurate to the
public story of the time.52 Further, this idea indicates that the Legion would need to drag its affairs
into the everyday life of the Romanian people. As the movement was based on the idea of action,
and rarely planned ahead in the long term, this would be a source of many problems.
During its existence, the Legion’s stance on Jews had a distinct impact on Romanian
society. In fact, the LAM’s anti-Semitic propaganda led one young man into a failed murder
attempt. The only result of the murder, was that the Council of Ministers officially banned the Iron
Guard in early January 1931.53 The Legion believed that the Jews were in league with communists
to take control of Romania, and used a number of different avenues to assert their control.54 While
it is possible that a large number of important and lucrative jobs were filled by people of Jewish
descent, the fascists gave little to no evidence of any actual conspiracy, beyond the banning of the
Iron Guard for attempted murder, as they believed the democracy was run by Jews, and therefore
were trying to silence them. 55 With Jews being perceived as having such a large portion of the
professions of the nation, they became an even easier scapegoat for anti-Semites. At this point in
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history, while the future of Romania was more in the hands of the average Romanian citizen than
ever, it was also uncertain and potentially frightening for some. Politically, democracy was still a
relatively new experience, especially when applied to every Romanian man. Because of the
presence of Jews in the positions of power most associated with these fields, the Jews became
quick and obvious targets for these issues. It is no coincidence that the fascist perspective saw the
Jews as responsible for the introduction of democracy, as both were reviled by the fascists. 56
However, while the fascists hated democracy, a new political system that challenged the prior
establishment of Romania and the world that the fascists sought to build, the hatred of the Jews
reached back centuries. According to historian Dragos Stoica, “The religious anti-Semitism of the
Middle Ages is rationalized as a defensive theory against a shadow empire, designed to destroy
everything in its path. The consequences of non-action will be the total domination (direct or by
proxy) over a social body structured by anomy and powerless against a coordinated assault.”57
Thus, the fascist anti-Semitism was both a mixture of long festering hatred, and a fear of the new
and the unknown. This combination of hatred allowed the Legion of the Archangel Michael (LAM)
to make an effective scapegoat, especially for any youth that were disheartened by the state of
Romania.
Further, it was not an accident that the Iron Guard’s origins came from the universities of
Romania. In order to compete in government jobs, which were in high demand and almost
guaranteed upward social mobility for the rural Romanians, a college degree was required.58
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Essentially, seats in universities were in high demand, and as they were highly competitive, the
material backgrounds of students were important factors. According to Zvi Yavetz, a
contemporary Jewish observer, “the number of places in dormitories was limited, rents were high,
and government scholarships few. Jewish students, however, came from urban areas, lived at home
with their parents, and even if they were not rich, appeared as such in comparison to Rumanian
students. Any anti-Semitic propaganda thus fell on fertile ground.”59 This explains a great deal of
the anger toward Jews from Romanians who attempted to enter the universities of their home
country. The system seemed rigged against Romanians, and skewed unfairly towards Jews, who
represented up to 40% of some departments.60 Therefore, when groups like the LAM began calling
for a numerus clausus to call for a more representative university selection system, the poorer
Romanian who wanted to make a better life was more inclined to agree with this than a more
extreme entry point for such an organization. These potential students were experienced with what
appeared to be a corrupt system that catered to a minority group while leaving the poorer majority
at a serious disadvantage. If there was already seemingly proof of a conspiracy, it would be much
easier for the prospective member to be convinced of a greater conspiracy, and therefore become
a dedicated to the cause. Therefore, it is possible that one of the earliest issues of interest to the
LAM was in fact a useful recruitment method as well.
Rather than simply making speeches and advocating the sidelining of the Jewish people,
the Iron Guard frequently radicalized their members and committed heinous acts of violence
toward members of the Jewish community. The Iron Guard was much quicker to take action on
what they believed to be the problems of the state. As an example of the organization’s eagerness
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to act, comes an episode in Cernauti in 1938, in which two synagogues, five Jewish owned private
houses and two Jewish owned factories were burned down by members of the Iron Guard, who
willingly confessed to the crime.61 This violence against Jews became more prevalent the more
power the Iron Guard was afforded. An example comes from the testimony of David Stoliar, a
survivor of the Holocaust in Romania. According to Stoliar, in 1941, violence against Jews was
very widespread, to the point of there being open killings of Jews in the streets. Stoliar recalls that
these murders were allowed to happen, as many members of the police by this point were either
members of, or friendly to, the Iron Guard.62 Finally, during the Legionary Revolt in 1941, the
Legionaries also incited a pogrom in Bucharest, that led to violence against more than 2,000 Jews,
as well as their property. Included in the devastation of the pogrom was the defacing or destruction
of twenty-five synagogues, one of which is pictured here.63 Either by direct action, or simply by
the lack of enforcement of the law for the Jews, the Iron Guard was responsible for the actions of
the radicalized Romanians who murdered many Jewish people, regardless of if they were students
or not.
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A critical element to the Legion’s attempt to gain power in the political sphere of Romania
came from its low-level organization. This was what was known as the cuiburi, or nest. These
nests would be the smallest units within the LAM for men, in some cases being as small as three
individuals.64 The purpose of the nest was to cultivate the virtues the LAM regarded as desirable
for young men. Codreanu believed that this would be the way to bring about his dreams of spiritual
revolution in Romania. The foremost reason for this thought was that starting out with an overt
attempt against the government would be doomed to fail. Instead, a leader would gather a group
of other young men, and they would set out to live by the virtues that the laws of the legion set
out. The laws of the Legion demanded that the men be disciplined, hardworking, active in their
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communities, educated in the Legion, always available to help a fallen legionnaire, and honorable.
These nests were integrated into villages, districts, counties and provincial commands, based on
how much the individual leaders could manage. This was not a strictly organized, hierarchical
affair, but one that was based entirely on the abilities of the leaders. In theory, whoever was most
qualified to lead the largest swath of land for the Legion would do so, allowing for a greater overall
competency of each leader.65 These nests would use their small size to their advantage by
encouraging more personal relationships, and be not just a place for politics, but also where one
would be accepted by peers. The nest would be a family made of the members’ friends, rather than
their blood. Codreanu writes, “One did not come in as into a cold barracks but as into his own
house, among his own family.”66 With a bond this close, the members had a greater stake in the
organization. The nest was led by its founder and passively attracted members by being an example
of a traditional Romanian man and not by “sleeve pulling and fishing for members.”67 This would
allow the new members to become truly committed to their ranks, and less likely to leave if they
had second thoughts on the ideology. Further, the fact that these nests were for the most part young
men, generally nineteen years or older, but with sections for younger men, meant it could act as
an additional incentive to join a nest.68 As the movement spread throughout Romania, it is likely
that young men would be willing to join simply for the opportunity to meet other passionate and
driven young people, through the invitation of legionnaires.69 Thus, the nest was a critical element
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in paving way for the future of the fascist Romania. Without the nests assuring that the populace
was ready for their movement, the LAM would make no attempts at direct political changes.
Related to the nests were cetăţuie, or fortresses. The fortresses were the equivalent of the
nest for women, and would serve a slightly different purpose.70 Rather than focusing on the virtues
of the man, the fortress aimed at promoting the idea of what a woman ought to be, mothers of good
Romanian men who would take care of and support the men as they established the front against
modern life.71 The historian Roland Clark writes, “fortresses took part in sewing competitions to
produce legionary insignias and collect dry flowers to sell for fund raising purposes. Even if their
legionary work required many of the same skills that their domestic duties did, it was being used
for political purposes.”72 This system of nests and fortresses, and how they focused on the what
the meaning of their gender was, proved to be quite useful in transforming the lives of those who
were drawn into the politics of the legion.
However, it is in this low-level organization of the Legion that one of its greatest problems
throughout its history can be found. While the nest system was a highly successful recruitment
method, not to mention a way to keep members engaged, it was the only formal organization of
the movement. This meant that there was some degree of chaos in the structure of the organization
as a whole. To move beyond the small purview of a nest, which was only meant to be comprising
up to thirteen people, Codreanu said,
How did I acquire leaders over the larger units? I nominated no leader for village, district
or county. I told them: ‘Conquer and organize! And, as much as you can organize, you will
be chief over.’ I just confirmed them leaders in the positions to which their power, qualities
and aptitudes elevated them. We started with the nest’s leader and progressively he grew
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to village leader, district, the town and county leader, and only in 1934, that is seven years
later, to the regional leader.73
While on paper the idea of only having the most qualified and successful be the higher-level
leaders, this does pose a significant problem. Just because one is a successful leader at the level of
nest, does not necessarily mean they will be as competent as at higher levels. While this may be a
problem shared with a democratic system another weakness is that of human ego. Should a given
nest leader be hungry for advancement within the organization, they would not be likely to consider
that perhaps they have flaws that might not be conducive to an effective power dynamic. Further,
this model of advancement creates cutthroat competition between the members. If there is one
suitably ambitious or unscrupulous individual looking to take control of a county’s division of the
LAM, corruption or some other underhanded method for attaining power would be more
devastating. Finally, the idea that the movement is structured as to what the given leader believes
that they can organize is another shortcoming. This is almost welcoming nest leaders to bite off
more than they can chew, and cause friction within the movement. Judging from what Codreanu
said in his memoir, there is no safe guard against the possibility of two or more nest leaders
disagreeing over who is actually in charge of a given area. This would inevitably result in a
breakdown of communication, and a complete lack of efficiency in the mission of the Legion, as
members would need to take sides and devote energy into this conflict. This romantic ideal of a
Darwinian “Survival of the Fittest” approach to leadership would be just as likely to leave the
rank-and-file confused and without leadership. While later on the Iron Guard would appear to take
on slightly more organized trappings, fitting of their paramilitary ambitions, these “battalions” and
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dividing Bucharest into sectors did little to alleviate the fact that the movement still remained
disorganized in its functioning, and remained short-sighted in action.74
The Legion managed to become as successful as it was, because it was capable of taking
in the young people of Romania, especially the students of Romania, and giving them an outlet to
use whatever skills or ambitions they had. Even something as simple as sewing or flower picking
became a source for a great sense of purpose that encouraged members to be active and to recruit
new members. With this sort of recruitment campaign, impressionable and malleable young people
would be easy for the nest leaders to lure into the cause, and mold into whatever roles were needed.
One of the most prolific idealogues of the Guard, Ion Mota, expressed a similar sort of sentiment
in a letter regarding his involvement in the Spanish Civil War. He wrote, “There, I have said that
they are ‘blessed’, these soldiers… because the only way a man can be really happy is to live this
earthly life in such a way as to be able to hope for the salvation of his soul.”75 This line of thinking
suffuses every action of the Guard. When all activities have a sacred layer, it incentivizes greater
effort, especially among the conservative youth that the Guard were trying to recruit. Considering
that even before the height of the movement, when it may have contained as many as 272,000
members, more than 3,500 of its members could be arrested at once and not impact its growth a
large amount, this appears to have worked fairly well.76 Utilizing this sort of devotion to work,
that no matter how small or large a task it was still vital and meaningful to the work of the
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organization, the Guard had a large source of eager to please young people, who were more than
ready to take on any role given to them.
This sense of belonging is combined with another, numinous feeling of belonging for the
members of the Legion. The Legion was heavily based in traditional Orthodox Christian values,
and thus had a transcendent frame of looking through the world. This meant that every act of the
Legion was in some way suffused with the believe that it was part of something greater. In For
My Legionaries, Codreanu writes about the importance of four values in the lives of the first
Legionaries. The very first of these is as follows, “1. Faith in God. All of us believed in God. None
of us was an atheist. The more we were alone and surrounded, the more our preoccupations were
directed toward God and toward contact with our own dead and those of the nation. This gave us
an invincible strength and a bright serenity in the face of all blows.”77 Here, Codreanu writes of
the zealous approach that he and the other Legionaries had to life in the early Legion. This is
indicative that the LAM would approach all things with the same belief in something greater than
the individual. This use of Christianity would be quite appealing to those who may have been
disillusioned from the current Romanian social order, by appealing to traditional values and
promising that what recruits knew was good would lead Romania to power and greatness.
Despite its foray into democracy, the LAM was fervently opposed to it, seeing it as a
fundamentally flawed system that would not bring about the best results for the Romanian people.
Codreanu identified six reasons why the Romanian nation should shed off democracy, and instead
opt for a form of government founded on the values of the Romanian Orthodox Church. This
government would be led by a single chief whose will would represent the single truth, which the
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public would share with him, though no election would take place. There would be an unspoken
understanding that this chief would be selected, as he would be the best leader of men and be
guided for the interest of the immortal nation.78 The first reason for this aversion was the fact that
democracy divides people.79 The Iron Guard believed that Romania’s power was best preserved
not just by the unity of its people, but specifically the ethnic Romanian people. In a democracy,
the people of Romania would be divided, as a democracy requires some form of division in order
to provide choices. To the Iron Guard the choice of National Liberal Party, National Peasant Party,
or any other party ultimately did not matter, as they all divided Romanians, and thus the power of
Romania. This fear was exacerbated by the novelty of democracy at the time. By the time of the
LAM’s founding in 1927, the constitution making Romania a democracy with universal male
suffrage was only about four years old.80 Without a longstanding democratic tradition, such as
those held in the United States or United Kingdom, the idea that each person who lived in Romania
should have an equal voice in politics was an even more alarming proposition to some citizens
than it was in those democratic countries. Even those countries had issues with representing each
person, so a nation that is just getting started with democracy would likely have a harder time
coming to terms with this system. To the ultra-nationalistic Legion, the Romanian race was
subordinate only to God. Thus, they believed that appealing to unity of the race was more important
than answering to the authority of the constitution and a democratic government that divided the
people of Romania along party lines. Ion Mota demonstrated this aversion to democracy when he
wrote in a letter just before entering the Spanish Civil War in 1936, “No force, no love exists which
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is higher than the race (and can only be realized in the race), except for the force of Christ and the
love of Him.”81 For the member of the Iron Guard, the act of placing anything above the good of
the race was akin to blasphemy. By placing democracy above a race that is second only to the will
of God, they were elevating democracy to a form of idolatry.
The second major issue that the Iron Guard had with democracy was how it treated Jews.82
The Iron Guard was principally concerned with the role of Jews in Romania, believing them to be
one of the root causes of the woes of the Romanian people. Any form of government that would
protect the rights of the Jew and raise them to the same level as that of the native ethnicity, would
be abhorrent to them. The Iron Guard was vehemently opposed to the constitution, as it upheld the
rights of Jews. Codreanu wrote, “We have lived here for thousands of years; with the plow and the
weapon; with our labor and our blood. Why should we be equal to those who have been here for
hardly 100, 10, or 5 years?”83 With this outlook, one can see the logical process that the Iron Guard
took to believe in the discrimination against Jews.
Codreanu’s third complaint about democracy was that of a lack of what he called
continuity. The principal here was that when the reins of power are capable of being transferred
from one party to another, it is much harder for legislation for a single grand plan to survive to see
completion. In the context of the fascist Iron Guard, this would likely involve legislation to
disenfranchise and, as implied by the violence the Guard used against them, remove the Jews from
Romanian society.84 Legislation that would act this way, barring interference from a dictator,
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would likely need more than a single term in office to get through to make a meaningful effect.
While it is not impossible to achieve long term plans through democracy, it would certainly be
harder to do so. Thus, Codreanu’s aims to expunge Romania of all its “Judaic corruptions” was
best served by eliminating democracy, allowing for the development of a long-term plan of attack
to remove the Jewish people from the nation.
The fourth point that Codreanu raised against the institution of democracy was related to
the idea of authority. Codreanu believed that since the politician is beholden to their constituents,
one cannot make a hardline stance on any given issue that the public may not like. In this way of
thinking of democracy, the roles of the traditional tyrant and people in Western thought are
reversed. Rather than one tyrant exerting his will against an innocent majority, the tyrannical
majority forces the moral politician to choose “either the renunciation of his lifetime’s labor or the
satisfaction of his supporters.”85 Due to the need of gaining public support, a politician would not
necessarily be able to do what he believed needed to be done for the best interest of the nation.
In the fifth point, Codreanu believed that political parties could not resist corruption. The
Iron Guard’s hatred of wealth and democracy dovetailed together into a similar hatred of those
who embezzled and stole wealth from others. Further, even if one party were to pursue adversaries
for their corruption, Codreanu believed that the party taking the initiative would eventually reveal
its own corruption in the process. This would lead to both sides losing support from the people,
thereby allowing the cycle of corruption to continue. 86 In fact this hatred of corruption actually
briefly outweighed the Guard’s hatred of democracy. In a period of constructive contribution to
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the parliament in the mid-1930s, the Iron Guard gained great support for its hardline stance against
corruption in government.87 However, this cooperation with democracy was only temporary. The
Guard was willing to work in parliament until democracy and the constitution could be dispensed
with. This period of cooperation appeared to be mainly caused by the movement’s opposition to
wealth and corruption, which they saw as endemic to the system.88
The Guard was not alone in believing that the Romanian government was corrupt. During
his time in Romania, a foreign minister from Finland, Carl Gustaf Idman, observed Romania from
his posting from the late 1920s to late 1930s in Bucharest. Idman was the Finnish envoy to both
Poland and Bucharest during this period, so his observations in both places were likely not as deep
as if he had only been assigned to one.89 Regardless, in one of his dispatches, Idman wrote of a
soldier who was capable of escaping an eighteen-month term of service in only six months by
paying a portion of his salary to his commanding officer.90 This alleged defender of the Romanian
people was able to easily shave off two thirds of his service time, merely by paying an officer.
While a single instance of such an event happening is not likely to create a serious problem for the
country at large, the fact that this was seen by a foreign minister who was unlikely to have the time
to investigate issues like this or spend time with common people to find out about it, implies that
it was unlikely that these issues were rare. Further, Idman, present in Romania for 1938, attributes
the entire genesis of the Legionnaire movement to the corruption of Romanian officials, claiming
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it was, “rooted into the Romanian inner life and not a result of German sponsorship.”91 As an
outside observer looking into the issues of Romanian society, Idman had a unique perspective on
what the Iron Guard did and stood for. Rather than being as emotionally connected to the
movement as someone who had to live his entire life under the influence of these officials, Idman
was capable of a more disconnected and dispassionate response to this movement.
The final point that Codreanu outlines as the reasons against democracy is the fact that
democracy is under the control of big finance.92 Since the Iron Guard was fervently opposed to the
role of wealth in the nation, it makes sense for the organization to likewise be opposed to an
institution that would promote the role of wealth in the nation, particularly its use in election
campaigns. Instead of doing what was needed or what was right for the nation, the idea is that
those under the influence of finance will instead be corrupted by the wealth available to them.
Either the need to repay the money borrowed for a campaign, or the simple fact of having such a
grand amount of money may have made some politicians more focused on money than doing the
right thing. Further, he believed that this meant that the politicians would be slaves to Jews.
Codreanu writes, “Because of the expensive system and the competition among various groups,
democracy needs a lot of money. As a natural consequence it becomes the slave of the great Jewish
international finance which subjugates it by subvention.”93 The 1931 Neamt campaign, the
Guard’s first major success, was a counter idea to this feared state of corruption. Rather than
spending princely sums of money on an election campaign, a nearly resourceless Iron Guard put
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on an ultimately successful election bid in the countryside, using only the will of the party
members. Thus, this campaign strategy used rendered the amounts of money in use for usual
election campaigns extravagant and unnecessary. In this way, cheaper and possibly more effective
methods of campaigning made traditional financing for campaigns obsolete. However, one can
go even further in the needs to eliminate unnecessary funding for the reason of government. Even
the Neamt campaign needed some money to organize and conduct. If, as the Guard thought was
best, there were no elections, there would be fewer opportunities for money to tempt politicians.
Instead, only the Iron Guard, who believed themselves above the corruption of material wealth
due to their self-reliance, would be capable of making the decisions for the nation.94
During his time in Parliament, Codreanu failed to capitalize on the surprising amount of
political power that the party was able to attain, despite being openly against the very institution
that afforded them that power. Codreanu made a list of seven demands for the parliament of
Romania. These seven demands were ultimately targeted against other members of parliament,
and was aimed to curtail perceived abuses of the Romanian people by wealthy actors. One night,
Codreanu claimed that he was showing the parliament that the country was invaded by an insidious
plot of Jews. The cause of this accusation was the fact that many members of parliament owed
money to a bank that Codreanu believed was a “Judaic nest of conspiracy and corruption”.95
Codreanu’s solution to this problem was as follows:
1. We demand the introduction of the death penalty for the fraudulent
manipulators of public funds. …
2. We demand the investigation and confiscation of the wealth of those
who have bled our poor country.
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3. We demand that all politicians who may be proved guilty of having
worked against the interests of our country by supporting shady
speculations or in any other fashion, be brought to justice.
4. We demand that the in the future, politicians be barred from the
administrative boards of the various banks and financial enterprises.
5. We demand the expulsion of the hordes of pitiless exploiters who have
come here to drain the riches from our soil and exploit the work of our
hands.
6. We demand that the territory of Romania be declared the inalienable
and indefeasible property of the Romanian Nation.
7. We demand that all campaigning agents be sent to work and that a single
command be established, which will inspire the whole Romanian Nation
with one heart and one mind.96
This list of demands shows that the LAM was not a well-developed organization capable of ruling
a nation. Codreanu, in essence, proposed a coup to parliament, without any kind of political
infrastructure to be able to support this list of demands. With the combination of demands one and
three, Codreanu essentially proposed the murder of several of his colleagues in parliament. This
strategy was doomed to fail, as it only made members of parliament who were otherwise enemies
united against a common enemy. Further, it speaks to the fact that the LAM, Codreanu especially,
was not gifted with foresight. The sentiment of the LAM being nearsighted and reckless is
confirmed by Codreanu himself in the following paragraph, where he states “They were not the
result of some prolonged thinking or ideological search, but the result of momentary reflections
over what the Romanian people needed then, without delay.”97 Codreanu admitted that he did not
put a great deal of thought into a proposed abolition of democracy, and acted merely based on
what he thought was most pressing in the moment. This is the same leader who believes that he is
a member of Romania’s elite, “who possess certain aptitudes and specialties.”98 He genuinely
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believed that this was the best way to secure power for his movement, to propose a sudden
revolution when his party had a total of two seats in parliament as their share of government power.
At its formation, and even through much of its later life, the Iron Guard did not have
political agendas as complex as more developed political parties. However, this did not stop the
Guard from organizing into their distinctive nests and fortresses, and acting to try and bring about
the end of the Jewish conspiracy that they perceived all around it. These nests would be used to
great success to allow the Guard to grow in power until it could even feasibly attempt to run for
office in the early 1930s. It was through this experience in office that Codreanu, the leader of the
Guard would crystalize his hatred of democracy, and articulate why it would be incompatible with
the fascist order he sought to enact in Romania. Through dogged persistence, and a refusal to
compromise with anything that came in its way, the Iron Guard established their goal, and acted
in order to pursue it: an undemocratic nation ruled exclusively by the Romanian people, for
exclusively the Romanian people. However, the tendencies of the Iron Guard toward thuggish
violence, lack of planning ahead, and despite its occasional competence, the Iron Guard failed to
attain the power in Romania that it was looking for.

Chapter Two:
Fitting in: 1931-41

The early 1930s were a time of turbulent clashes in Romanian society. Many clashes
occurred between conservative students, such as those in the Iron Guard and the League of
National Christian Defense (LANC) and police forces. One cause of these clashes were the roles
of the Jews in society. One incident, ordinary in its scope and rhetoric, was the demonstration in
Galatz, in 1930. This event occurred after a period of time of mounting tensions between the Iron
Guard and the Jewish communities of Bessarabia, including the vandalism of Jewish cemeteries
in the region. Ultimately, these growing tensions led to a confrontation between the students and
police and gendarme forces. During this violent clash, after breaking through a police cordon.
students allegedly shouted “Death to the Jews!”99 Evidently the students were extremely dedicated
to the removal of Jews from all public spaces of Romanian life, willing to potentially risk their
lives in running a police barricade, as fatal shootings of legionaries were not unheard of. In fact, it
was not uncommon to have religious services for these fatalities.100This sort of rabid fanaticism
was not uncommon for members of the Iron Guard, nor was their hatred of the Jews.
The Iron Guard’s relationship with the Romanian public was complicated. Rather than
being overwhelmingly accepted by both government and the people of Romania, or being hated
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by both, the Iron Guard had a mixed reputation. Its opposition to Communists and Jews, in likely
endeared it to the more traditional members of Romanian society, while its disorganization and
penchant for violence made it a nuisance for the government of Romania. Throughout the years
leading to the Iron Guard’s violent end in the Legionary Rebellion of 1941, it could be said that
the Iron Guard found support among the Romanian public, but never found such a niche in the
Romanian parliament.
To begin, it should be noted that the LAM was able to attract a large number of supporters
throughout its life. Otherwise, it would not be worth discussing this movement, if they had no
popular support. The height of this general public support was demonstrated in the 1937 elections,
while operating as the legal Totul Pentru Tara (Everything for the Country) party, the LAM
received the third largest number of votes, securing 66 seats in parliament, behind the Liberal
party’s 152 and the Peasant party’s 86 seats.101 This represents a massive increase in votership
from only 1931, shooting from 1 to 15.58% of the popular vote of the nation. Among these voters
were principally the young, although it attracted a large swath of disillusioned and upset people of
Romania.102 Regardless of who they were, the LAM was able to attract a significant portion, if not
the plurality, of the Romanian populace.
Jews and Communists served to be one of the most prolific scapegoats for the Romanian
fascists. Much of the turmoil and distress of the aftermath of World War I was placed squarely on
their shoulders, and were often harshly treated as a result. In terms of the fear of Communists,
there was a very real reason to fear a potential threat. Over the course of about two years, Romania
had no less than two neighboring nations transform into Communist regimes, Hungary and the
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USSR. In both cases, not only was there the threat of traditional cultural mores being obliterated
by the new economic and political system, but also of bloody and brutal violence due to the new
parties coming into power. Although the Hungarian communist party was short lived, when
combined with the threat of Soviet Union, it likely left a lasting and frightening impression on the
Romanian people.103
The Russian Revolution was seen as a warning for some members of the Romanian people.
The very first group that Corneliu Codreanu organized was a pact of fellow high school students
in 1919 to defend their home of Husi. Codreanu starts his memoir, For My Legionaries with the
formation of this pact in the Dobrina Forest near his home town. He described calling together
twenty students of diverse years of high school to meet in the woods. Codreanu voiced his concern
of the possibility of the Bolshevik army invading the Moldavian region of Romania, and suggested
that the boys form a militia to defend their home. Evidently the students, and even many of the
adults of Husi agreed, as the militia quickly formed, scavenged the necessary arms for drilling,
and found itself approved by the Husi high school principal. The militia was known as “Mihail
Kogalniceanu”, seemingly named after a Romanian nationalist, and foreshadowing later Legion
of the Archangel Michael (LAM) activities, held many lectures in public to promote nationalist
ideas.104 Codreanu believed that the need for such an organization was a product of the times,
writing, “There was then such a chaotic state of affairs in the country that we, but children hardly
over 18 years of age, understood all too well.”105 Codreanu recognized the fact that it was unusual
and concerning for such young people to be engaged in these types of politics. It is likely that the
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experience of organizing this group led to the successes of the Legionary movement in the late
1930s and early 1940s. Codreanu most likely took the skills that applied to recruiting for this
organization, and modeled some of the practices of the LAM after what worked for the Mihail
Kogalniceanu. Despite the fact that the Russian Revolution was less immediately dangerous for
the generations of students who joined the LAM during the height of its power, the fact was that
the Soviet Union was still a nation sitting on the border of Romania, practicing a social order that
advocated for the destruction of what many Romanians held dear. It is also important to note that
Bessarabia only became a part of Romania in 1918, following an initiative proposed by Romania
to protect it from Bolshevism in early 1918.106 With one province of Romania already being a
large target for a potential irredentist desire among Bolsheviks, this situation made it very easy for
a militia to spring up. Further, if this militia was the earliest ancestor of the Iron Guard, its
disorganization would make more sense, as it was a small group of high schoolers being brought
together to fight, without military training.
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days, Romania would mobilize. While no military action actually occurred as a result of this, the
mere necessity for a declaration of war so shortly after World War I spoke volumes.108 Further,
the next year, the Romanian government made an official military alliance with Poland for the
event of the Soviets trying to invade Romania by way of Bessarabia again.109 The event of a Soviet
invasion was evidently on the minds of the leaders of Romania. Due to there being the constant
enemy of a communist state on the horizon of Romania, it seems that the LAM had a good reason
to be opposed to Communists. Because of the proximity and threat of a communist state, it would
not be unthinkable that there would be agents for them working within Romania. Thus, the LAM
was able to find a role by opposing the communists, which helped make the organization more
appealing to traditionalists in Romania. The use of the communists as a political target may have
also been helped by the fact that they were not an especially powerful political group at the time.
In the 1928 elections, for example the Communist party was unable to achieve the necessary two
percent of the vote to be represented in Parliament.110 While this may not seem significant, it made
the Communist party an easy target. It both had reason to be detested, and was not politically
strong enough to be able to easily dismiss the claims of the LAM. Therefore, the Communist party
proved to be one of the LAM’s safest targets to demonstrate to the public that the Legion was a
worthwhile entity.
An excellent example of someone who was endeared to the idea of the anti-Communism
and an anti-USSR foreign policy was Michel Sturdza, one time prince of Romania, and member
of the Iron Guard. Though he was not a founder of the movement, he was highly devoted to it,
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even coming to face legal repercussions on account of his actions.111 Sturdza claimed that the
Soviet Union aimed to make a fake alliance, which he on more than one occasion refers to as a
trojan horse, in order to situate itself to destroy the Western World.112 Sturdza then went on to say
that
The Legionary Movement represented the most powerful, the most irreducible opposition
in Rumania to the Anonymous Powers that wanted to introduce to the Kremlin gang as
comrades-in-arms in the drama of European Rivalries. The greater and more intimate grew
the collusion between the Soviets and those powers…the greater grew also the campaign
of slander and the persecutions of against the Movement and its chief, Codreanu.113
Here, two things about Sturdza are shown. First, that he perpetuated unsubstantiated claims that
there was a conspiracy among the Romanian government to hand the nation over to the Soviet
Union, and that any criticisms of the Iron Guard were a result of collusion with these powers. This
shows that, even among the upper echelons of Romanian society, the Iron Guard had an appeal
based on its devotion to being opposed to Communism. It seems that this was likely the main
reason why Sturdza was involved with them in the first place. Taking Sturdza’s belief in both the
role and the power of the Iron Guard, it is not unreasonable to assume that there were others
throughout Romania who likewise believed that the Iron Guard was the best hope as a guard
against the Soviet Union and Communism.
The beginning of public acceptance of the Iron Guard was found in 1931, specifically in
Neamt. The 1931 general elections marked the first successes of the Iron Guard in the democratic
government of Romania, while operating under the name of the “Corneliu Codreanu Group”,
because the Iron Guard was officially banned by the govenrment in 1931. The group was able to
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secure a modest number of votes, but ultimately, not enough to influence parliament. In August,
when a seat in the Romanian Parliament had opened up in the county of Neamt, the Iron Guard
made its attempt to break into the sphere of national politics. However, due to the campaigning in
the earlier general election, the Guard exhausted its resources for any further political ambitions.
This did not deter Codreanu from marshalling his forces for the new election. With financial
donations from one family who were members, the movement successful registered onto the ballot.
Rather than spending immense amounts of money on a traditional campaign, Codreanu turned out
his one hundred campaigners, “…on foot, in boundless faith, though they knew no one, not what
they would eat or where they would sleep from then on.”114
During the campaign, the Guard took up an interesting, yet simple form of propaganda in
order to persuade the peasants to their cause. Members of the legion would work on the farm,
helping many potential voters perform their daily chores and tasks.115 This also provided the
opportunity for the Guard to proselytize their beliefs directly to the people who would be voting.116
As a result of the campaign, the Guard won a surprising victory in the county, with 11,300 votes
compared to the next highest count of 7,000 votes for the liberals. Codreanu attributed this victory
to focused campaigning on the electoral districts that favored the Guard rather than splitting
resources to deal with those districts that opposed him. Ultimately it was the sense of belonging
and purpose that the nest and Guard gave to the young people of Romania that enabled this victory.
117
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alongside farmers in order to secure votes for the movement that had taken them in. The kind of
belonging that the Guard offered would be especially comforting for young people who spent their
formative years hearing that Romania would be a great power, a message which contrasted with
the world and failing economy of their nation around them. Thus, this system was able to lure in
the young people of the nation, and utilize them as extremely effective political tools.
Despite the success of this form of campaigning, this highlighted the decentralization of
the LAM. In this particular instance, the LAM benefitted from it, in that the individual members
were allowed to go out into the country side, and do all they could to convince the peasants there
to vote for the party, but ultimately, this was not a thought-out plan. This was simply seizing an
opportunity that prevented itself, while the movement had little in the way of funds. Acting rashly,
and without a concrete plan was a common thread throughout the history of the Iron Guard, and
ultimately led to its downfall, when it went against a better organized and better armed adversary
in the Romanian Army. Because events like the Neamt campaign of 1931 succeeded for the
Legion, it is likely that the organizers did not see the need for more thought out, long term plan.
Another important factor to the public acceptance of the Iron Guard was how the upper
echelons of society endorsed the anti-Semitism of the Guard. According to Yavetz, this important
role is one of the elements that helped the iron Guard to grow the way that it did. Before 1935, the
Iron Guard did not have a very pleasant reputation. Indeed, Yavetz claims that many of the
members of the Guard were in fact embarrassed and afraid to openly wear their green shirts
outdoors. However, between 1935 and 1937, many prominent individuals spoke in favor of the
Iron Guard, and more specifically the idealism of the young people who were joining. Some of
these were politicians, however others were people as influential as King himself and the Patriarch
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of the Romanian Orthodox Church.118 With such support being specifically aimed at the youth
joining the Iron Guard, it is no wonder that there was positive growth for the organization.
The LAM was never particularly accepted by the government of Romania, although it did
have a substantial appeal to the populace. The story of the simultaneous welcoming of the LAM
by the people of Romania can be seen through its turbulent relationship with the police, and its
extreme success in the election of 1937. The Legion frequently ran afoul of the police of Romania,
due in no small part to its thuggish nature and attempts to silence enemies. As the incident in Galatz
shows, Legionaries were usually not afraid to engage in physical resistance to the police whenever
the two clashed, nor were the police afraid to respond in kind. Throughout most of its existence
the Legion was considered to be a terrorist group, rather than an official party with the same
prestige as the Liberal or Peasant parties.119 Given the methods that the Legion used, this was not
an unreasonable assumption to make. According to the Times of London, in 1938 there was
allegedly a spree of death threats against multiple government officials. As the publication comes
from London from just before the outbreak of war, any pro-Nazi groups, like the LAM, are likely
to be viewed with more suspicion, though perhaps not with the hostility that may have been seen
a few years later. Regardless, the alleged author of these threats wrote, “You will be assassinated
between January 1 and 15 because you oppose the Nationalist Movement.”120 With this type of
reaction to simply opposing the movement, it makes sense why the police would be opposed to
the Legion whenever it made waves in Romanian society.
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However, the Romanian public did not share this same antipathy to the LAM. The Legion’s
success in the 1937 elections mattered little in the long run, as King Carol II decided to choose a
prime minister from a much smaller party, hinting to the first of a number of dictatorships.121 From
here, Carol continued governmental animosity with the Iron Guard. This tension was increased
when King Carol and his minister of the interior, Armand Calinescu, had Codreanu and other
members of the Iron Guard arrested.122 Rather than allowing a trial, he and several other members
of the Iron Guard were arrested, and then executed in a staged prison escape attempt. 123 While
this may have been an attempt to destroy the leadership of the Iron Guard, this was a severe
miscalculation, as the movement did not take kindly to their almost deified founder and leader
being executed. As a result of Codreanu’s charisma, and the cult of personality that was built
around him, his death only made him a martyr, and likely increased the LAM’s resolve.124 Emil
Cioran, as cited by Stoica, wrote
In a nation of slaves, the Captain brought the concept of honor and in a spineless crowd he
gave us pride. One man’s faith gave birth to a world that is deeper than the ancient Greek
tragedy or Shakespeare. With the exception of Jesus no dead man was that present among
the living. From this moment on, our country will be ruled by a dead man. This dead man
has spread a perfume of eternity over our human misery, and brought back the sky over
Romania.
In the Legion’s eyes, the assassination of Codreanu brough him onto the level of Christ, the very
man that the LAM worshipped. So, by taking such a hardline stance against the Legion, the
Romanian government merely provoked and incensed the already fanatical LAM.

121

Hitchins, A Concise History of Romania. 174.

122

From Our Correspondent, “14 Iron Guards Shot”, Times of London, Dec. 1 1938. Pg.14

123

Stoica, 134

124

Stoica, 118

47
This provocation may explain one of the final notable acts of terrorism the LAM engaged
in against the government itself. In September of 1939, shortly after the onset of World War II, the
Iron Guard took its revenge on Calinescu, now prime minister. According to the Times of London,
the prime minister was assassinated by six young men of the Iron Guard, as he was travelling in
Bucharest. Following this incident, the men stormed a broadcasting center and announced over the
radio what happened, and that the Legion was responsible for it.125 This episode shows that the
LAM did not respond to governmental pressure to stand down without a fight. By killing the prime
minister, the Iron Guard tried to show that nothing would stand in their way from achieving power
and bringing about the changes they deemed were necessary for society. This assassination
ultimately led to as many as 400 members of the Iron Guard being executed, according to Mihail
Sebastian, a contemporary Jewish writer.126 However, the Iron Guard remained extant until 1940,
when Carol allowed General Ion Antonescu, an officer with connections to both the LAM and the
Nazi party of Germany, to form a government.127 It was under this government that Romania
entered World War II on the side of Nazi Germany, to respect Nazi wishes.
Under Antonescu, Carol was exiled on September 5th, 1940, and his son, Mihai, granted
Antonescu complete power over the state on the next day.128 Under this regime, the Legionary
movement found the closest that it ever had to governmental acceptance. Antonescu and the new
leader of the Legionary movement, Horia Sima, established a Legionary state. Sima became
deputy prime minister, and five other legionaries held ministerial posts.129 Under this government
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the Legion took control of broadcasting and publication, resulting in daily propaganda on the radio
and in newspapers. Antonsecu even called for a day of prayer throughout Bucharest, and ordered
people to stay on their knees and pray.130 For once, the Legion was finally in a position of true
power, and no longer needed to worry about law enforcement clashes. In fact, with their newfound
power, Legionaries took the opportunity to engage in police brutality and abuse their power. Jews
were the primary victims of these abuses, although anyone who was not enthusiastic enough about
the Legion’s power were subject to beatings.131 This period of Legionary ascendancy was
extremely short lived, due to the excessive violence. Fissures began to form between members of
the Legion, as some found Sima repugnant, and Legionaries began assassinating political prisoners
in their cells, and even murdered two politicians in their homes.132
On January 21st, 1941, in possibly the height of the movement’s disorganization and
political ineptitude, the Legionaries broke with the greater power of the Romanian government.
The London Times argues that this break was caused by Antonescu’s close relations with Germany,
and that the Iron Guard wanted to remain independent.133 While this is certainly a possible motive,
given the movement was largely nationalistic in nature and would therefore prefer a greater amount
of autonomy from an ally, it is also possible that this press piece may be more likely to attribute
this to anti-Nazism. Another interpretation comes from Mihail Sebastian, who recalls a student
manifesto calling for the removal of the head of the state police, reinstatement of the legionary
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interior minister who was allegedly removed earlier that day, and a government comprised solely
of legionaries. This version of events seems more likely, as the revolt was recorded as being highly
disorganized, with some pockets of Legionaries in the country unaware of what was happening,
and in some locations was represented by peaceful demonstration.134 Regardless of which version
of events are true, thousands of legionaries in Bucharest began to demonstrate against the
Antonescu government.135 After about three days of fighting, the Legionaries in Bucharest were
defeated, and the others throughout the countryside quickly followed suit, with Sebastian even
remembering it on the 24th as “a minor event, which fortunately had no consequences”. 136 The
end of the rebellion, for the most part, led to the death of the Legion of the Archangel Michael.
Afterwards, about 400 of the Legionaries fled to Germany where they were hidden away in
concentration camps, but were not forced into labor. They held a variety of jobs, and unlike the
prisoners in the camps were allowed to write on their ideology. Some members of the Legion even
worked with the Antonescu government, but by and large the power of the Legion was broken. 137
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wrong with Romania, the LAM was ultimately alienating a sizeable portion of the population, but
was also welcoming another large part. Additionally, by giving people, especially the young men
who felt that they were not getting the control of the nation they deserved, a target to blame, the
Legion found a ready new supply of voters. By giving people a way to confront a perceived
communist threat, it provided safety to those who were frightened by such cultural changes.
However, the fact that the LAM rarely took a subtle and peaceful approach to trying to change
what it wanted to change, and the fact that sometimes some parts of the Legion did not know what
the rest were doing, was ultimately its downfall. Perhaps receiving blow after blow from police in
small numbers may have helped the Legion in appearing as martyrs, but when mobilized in mass
against the military, the Legion, and the youth that it attracted, were unable to endure.

CONCLUSION:
COMPARISONS

The Legion of the Archangel Michael (LAM) and its paramilitary wing, the Iron Guard,
did not exist in a vacuum. The Nazis and Italian fascists were both more successful, and are more
well-known even into the modern day. Therefore, it is useful to look at the LAM and how it
succeeded or failed in comparison to these more infamous and successful movements. They are
all united in the idea of their home nation being something to save and protect, and for a hatred of
Jews. Additionally, in order to survive into the future, all three devised youth movements to carry
the momentum of the party forward. However, in each of these areas, the fascists do not necessarily
copy each other. Instead, each movement had its own unique outlook on the situation. In short,
while the Italians and Germans were interested in the expansion of the nation, structured opposition
to human rights, and preparing the youth for war, the LAM was concerned with religion,
maintaining Romania, and integrating the youth into the wider political movement. Finally, the
LAM’s disorganization and orientation toward small-scale violence led to its destruction by a
domestic foe, not an invasion of a foreign army.
To understand the differences between the Fascist organizations, it will be important to
have a basic understanding of these parties in isolation. The Nazi party took power in Germany in
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1933, and shortly thereafter formed the Hitler Youth.138 The Nazi party was infamous for its
treatment of the Jewish people, as a means to recover from perceived problems following World
War I. This general sense of anti-Semitism was not an invention of the Nazis, but was present for
a long period of time, even being used to exclude the Jews from so-called “battle communities”
during World War I. These communities were theoretical groups formed by soldiers in a time of
war, under the idea that the stress of combat would form the unit into a closer feeling of connection
than just through being employed by the same organization, but having an almost familial bond.
While in many cases these bonds did not form anyway, the German military during World War I
actively encouraged the distancing of Jews from these communities. The German military was
frightened by the growing number of working-class recruits who may have had socialist
tendencies, so to find a scapegoat to shuffle off any blame for the war effort, the German military
established a commission to investigate an alleged underrepresentation of the Jews.139 This attempt
to make it appear that the Jews were unwilling to fight for the country therefore likely made it
significantly easier for people to accept anti-Semitic propaganda should it arise. After all, in their
minds, they had precedent for this behavior. Thus, with this lie already in place, the Nazis had an
easier time blaming Jews for the failures of Germany. In this setting, it is possible that the German
public viewed these acts as just punishments against the Jews. This makes the Nazi emphasis on
race an easier argument to make. If the race of the Jews were unwilling to fight for the country
they lived in, but the Germans were, it would make sense to view the Germans as superior. In this
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line of thought, it is the Germans who are risking their lives for a higher cause then selfpreservation. Each lie about the Jews was a calculated step to reinforce the Nazi teachings of race.
The Nazis did not stop at only having anti-Semitic propaganda and rhetoric, but took steps
to remove rights from the Jewish people of Germany. Nearly immediately after attaining power in
Germany in 1933, the Nazis stripped away the abilities of the Jews to be lawyers or serve on juries,
and by 1935 they were officially second-class citizens.140 This is in sharp contrast to the antiSemitism of Romania, where disorganized mob violence was the most popular overt form of
expression. This was because the Nazi party was more organized, had more of a plan to deal with
what they perceived as a Jewish problem, and knew how to use political office to their ends.
Modern historian Timothy Snyder supports this claim, writing, “In everyday life, measures
directed against Jews forced Germans to think about Jews, to notice Jews, and to define themselves
as ‘Aryans,’ as members of a group that excluded the Jews with whom they shared the country.”141
This speaks to organization form the top down to change how people look at Jews and try to force
the people to see them as an enemy. In comparison, than the Iron Guard’s the Iron Guard took a
bottom up approach to try and preach anti-Semitism to the masses. Then it is through this
perspective that the Hitler Youth leaders must have molded by the children of Germany. Included
in this program was the fact that the instructors of the Hitler Youth taught children the Nazi
ideology of the superiority of the Aryan race from an early age. So, for the youth, there was a twopronged assault on the perception of Jews during the Third Reich. With the top-down measures of
trying to push Jews out, and the bottom-up education that the Jews are inferior, the result was a far
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more powerful push against the Jews than the mix of more passive preaching, and extreme violence
of the Iron Guard. The result of this difference was a more organized form of anti-Semitism than
was found in Romania. This organization to anti-Semitism made for a more sanitized form of antiSemitism for the public, as the German citizens did not need to see all the horrors of a pogrom. In
the beginning of the Second World War, the German forces engaged in the Eastern theater
practiced forms of mass executions.142 Instead, later on the government was entrusted with the job
of removing Jews. This happened not only in the infamous concentration camps, but also by using
the local authorities of the conquered territories. For example, in Estonia, the vast majority of the
Jews who stayed were killed by the Secret Police, under the watchful eyes of the German
authorities.143 This was because the practice of using government resources to isolate, group and
kill enemies of the state while out of the public eye of the German civilians, was both more efficient
and more palatable for the public of these states. By doing this, the Nazis were able to keep public
support for expansion and persecution, by obscuring the truth of their actions.
If the Nazis learned how to shift where Jews were taken to be killed, and how readily
available they were to be seen by the public, then the LAM never learned this lesson. For example,
in the Bucharest pogrom of 1941, during the Legionary Rebellion, the Legionaries did not make
any attempt to keep the 2,000 Jews that they abducted, tortured and killed out of public sight.
Rather, they marched into the two largest Jewish neighborhoods, rounded up Jews and brought
them to be killed. In fact, some were even held in the headquarters of a subdivision of the LAM.144
Further, rather than take over businesses after Jews were removed, many of the Legionaries
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decided to simply destroy buildings. In the same pogrom, over 1,000 buildings were destroyed by
the brute force of the Legionaries.145 Once again, this is in contrast to the method of the Nazis,
who after Kristallnacht switched to a less immediately visible method to persecute in Germany.
The extent of the damage to the psyche of even non-Jewish citizens of Romania was demonstrated
in doubts to the stability of the government of Romania. According to the Jewish Telegraphic
Agency, in December of 1933, that Foreign Minister Nicholas Titulescu complained, “that the
existence and the activities of the Iron Guard were shaking confidence in the Roumanian
government and making his task as Foreign Minister exceedingly difficult.”146 This indicates a
very real feeling of revulsion in some segments of the Romanian populace, if faith in the entire
government is being shaken due to the activities of a single domestic group. It also indicates that
the anti-Semitism of the Iron Guard negatively affected the international relations of Romania as
a whole, making other nations wary of dealing with a nation with such a blatant problem.
The youth movements of these organizations were radically different. In the Nazi regime,
the Hitler Youth had a significant emphasis on preparation for war. In many ways the Hitler Youth
were a form of preliminary military training. These ways included riflery training, roll calls with
military trappings, and even practicing war games among teenagers in German society. 147 By
introducing the youth to these practices, discipline and the basics of marksmanship, not only would
these soldiers be more suited for the battlefield than otherwise, but also allowed a greater volume
of soldiers to be turned out during wartime than would be possible in an ordinary matter. This was
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especially true following the March 1935 introduction of universal conscription.148 Not only would
more members of the future generations of the German public be members of the Nazi party due
to the indoctrination of the youth, but they would also be career soldiers, knowledgeable about the
life of the common solider in a militarized culture. This would likely cause a cycle of increasing
militarism and competence, as the generations of Nazi party members that embraced the teachings
of the Hitler Youth take positions in the government understand war. Having a cadre of
experienced officers in government, who happen to also be zealots in the name of a German first
political philosophy would lead to a German state in a prime position to wage war and expand. At
the core of this cycle, is the fact that the beginnings of military prowess and expansion are placed
on the shoulders of pliable youth.
Likewise, the Italian model of fascism saw the great need for a youth movement. It saw the
youth as the future, and naturally attracted them.149 The very first of what could be considered the
youth movements of Fascist Italy was the Student Vanguard (AS), which was an organization
aimed at uniting high school and university students in promoting fascism, and discouraging
student organizations of rivals like Socialists and Catholics.150 Instead, Mussolini had the AS
reorganize in the early 1920’s into the Fascist University Groups (GUF) and Advanguardie
Giovanili Fasciste (AGF), in order to be under direct party control and indoctrinate the youth in a
more uniform and organized way.151 Under the fascist party’s reign, an additional segment, the
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Balilla Groups, was formed, for the sake of incorporating young children into the indoctrination
of the masses in Italy.152 In 1926 however, all youth movements were incorporated into the Opera
Nazionale Balillo (ONB).153 Part of the curriculum of the ONB were marches, camping trips, first
aid training, and even military drills with muskets and bayonets.154 Between the aggressive
government and the inclusion of these practices, it is clear that the ONB was intended to prepare
the young Italians for foreign wars of expansion. Very similarly to Germany’s Hitler Youth, these
paramilitary training programs would be part of a vicious cycle allowing for the gradual
militarization of the youth.
The use of these youth movements contrast with the Iron Guard, in that the movement
primarily used the youth for the sake of advancing its domestic political agenda. While it is true
that the Iron Guard eventually involved its members in paramilitary training, the primary reason
for this training was not for foreign wars of expansion such as in Italy and Germany. The
paramilitary “death teams”, were used for domestic agitation, such as the undermining of the
current political order, to grow the strength of the Legion in Romanian society. Other duties of
these death teams were attacking civilians and inciting violent protests.155 This is a critical
difference between the Nazi Hitler Youth, in that the Hitler Youth was concerned taking the fight
to the enemy beyond the borders of the nation, while the young members of the LAM were not.
Instead, the paramilitary aspirations of the Romanian fascists were directed to their fellow
Romanians. Therefore, the LAM was more concerned with securing the cultural mores of Romania
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than creating an empire. This also speaks to the experiences of the rest of the Romanian fascist
movement. Most of the efforts of the Iron Guard were more internally focused. Likely due to the
fact that the Romanians lost no territory during World War I, Codreanu did not speak of any
irredentist tendencies, and instead focused on creating a new type of Romanian.156 This indicates
a low priority for expansionism and foreign policy. With this in mind, it makes perfect sense that
the Iron Guard was relatively unconcerned with preparing the youth for an “unavoidable war”. 157
Thus, the Romanian fascist group was not quite a dire threat to their surrounding neighbors, but
proved to be one to their own country. This shows that even without a direct desire for military
conquest or highly organized, industrialized murder, fascist groups can cause immense damage to
a country and its people.
A similar group to the Iron Guard however, were the German Sturmabteilung (assault
battalions), alternately known as the SA or the brownshirts. Like the Iron Guard, the SA frequently
engaged in hooligan violence, with a political backing. An example of this violence, was when the
SA would start fights over relatively unimportant events, such as auctions, so long as Jews were
involved.158 Another comparison point between the two, is the fall of the SA, as after the Nazis
came to power, the SA became a liability due to their indiscipline and violence.159 In 1934, during
the “Night of the Long Knives”, much of the SA were purged by the Germans, in circumstances
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very similar to what Sturdza claims happened during the Legionaries’ Revolt.160 According to
Sturdza’s account, the Legionary Revolt was fabricated by Antonescu, in much the same way as
the SA purge appears to have been performed. Regardless of the veracity of Sturdza’s claims, the
result was the same: a junior partner in a dictatorship was liquidated after proving itself to violent
and undisciplined for the good of the regime.
Perhaps the most significant difference in the Legionary Movement between the German
and Italian Fascists, was the use of Christianity. From the very instant that the Movement was
founded, it was entwined with the Romanian Orthodox branch of Christianity. This can be viewed
easily by Codreanu’s writing, “Moving forward in a united front, with the help of God and the
Romanian people’s justice, no matter what destiny awaited us—that of being vanquished or that
of death—it would be a blessed one and it would bear fruit for our people.”161 This passage speaks
of a uniquely religious form of conviction. Rather than being focused only on the racial aspect of
the nation, the religious is also called into service of the Legionaries. They believed that it was this
presence of God that would make their movement great, and even carry a form of acceptance
should the movement be defeated. This is unique from the other two mainstream fascisms, which
were more concerned with the idea of race and the nation, rather than religion.
An additional factor to the use of Christianity as a part of the movement, was the relatively
recent origin of the Romanian Orthodox Church, and its intense nationalism was likely a factor in
the forming of the LAM as a movement. It was not until 1918 that Romania, in the form that the
Iron Guard imagined it as, came to be. Instead, Romania was a small territory, missing some
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regions of ethnic Romanians. Further, many members of the new territories did not necessarily see
themselves as Romanian, so the state needed a mechanism to incorporate the new territories
ideologically into the new nation. Because of this, the state turned to religion to use as a unifying
factor.162 Faith was to become the mortar by which the Romanian nation was built. This united
well with the LAM, as many, not limited to the LAM believed that being a good Romanian
required adherence to the Orthodox faith. According to Stan and Turcescu, the Romanian
philosopher Nae Ionescu even said, “Roman Catholics and Jews could be ‘good Romanians’, that
is, dutiful citizens of the modern Romanian State, but they could never be members of the
Romanian nation, which he defined along ethnic lines.”163 In this way, any nationalists had an easy
way of excluding others who were not deemed “Romanian enough”. The fact that this was a trait
that was common among many of the Romanian Orthodox faithful means that the LAM would not
have even needed to work especially hard to use this as rhetoric, as it would likely have already
been widely spread.
While religion was not the mainstay of Nazism or Italian fascism, it is not to say that they
completely neglected religion in their movements. The Legionary movement was defined by its
religious element, there was no Legion of the Archangel Michael without Christianity. However,
while the Nazis used some rhetoric of being shaped by Protestantism, it was not entwined with the
movement.164 This is compared to the contemporary writer Alfons Wild, who believed that the
Nazis were in no way related to Christianity. In comparing Mein Kampf to the Bible, Wild declares
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that the Nazi movement was not in fact a Christian one. He refers to it as “heathen through and
through. It is not the case that the heathen worldview is just a secondary element…To the contrary,
it is the source of many errors and distorts the few truths to be found in Hitler’s thinking. Thus
love of the Fatherland is transformed into idolization of one’s own nation.”165 Here, it is seen that
fundamentally, Nazism is a completely different school of thought from Christianity. It may share
some similar attributes, but ultimately these are not the crucial elements of either. Instead, the
Nazis believed in the “gospel of race”.166 This small statement shows the difference of the driving
force of the two movements. Whereas Nazism was most concerned with the Aryan race and their
belief of superiority, the LAM believed that it was faith in Christ and their mission to deliver
Romania from corruption and Judaism. While it is true that the LAM believed in the superiority
of the Romanian race, it does not appear to be to the same way that the Nazis did. The LAM was
still concerned with race, but almost as if the Romanians were the new chosen people of God.
Therefore, it seems as though the LAM was more concerned with the matters of the spiritual than
they were with more concrete issues such as race.
Likewise, the Italian fascists, while by no means completely atheistic, were less concerned
with Christianity than the LAM was. The Italian fascists were indeed motivated by a spiritual
dimension, not just by the material ideas of nation and race. However, the spirituality is more
focused on the idea of the spirit of the nation, rather than religion. For example, in a speech,
Mussolini once said, “For us the nation is not just territory, but something spiritual. There are states
which have had immense territories and which have left no trace in human history. It is not a
question of size, because there have been minute, microscopic States in history that have
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bequeathed memorable, immortal specimens of art and philosophy. The greatness of the nation is
the totality of these qualities, of all these conditions.”167 Here, there is a similar kind of spiritual
ideal of the LAM, however, bent toward the nation before any kind of religion. Mussolini believes
that the will of the nation is the ineffable source of power that will lead the fascists to victory over
their foes, rather than, for example, the intervention of God. While this is a small difference
between the two, it is a distinct difference. Like how Alfons Wild wrote, the Italians in favor of
the fascists were becoming involved with idolizing and worshipping their nation, rather than a god.
That is not to say that there was no connection between Fascism and Christianity in Italy. In fact,
many members of the Catholic Church participated in Fascism, and even worked with Mussolini
in public events, such as the interring of “martyrs” in churches.168 The main distinction here
though, is that religion was an “add-on” to Italian Fascism, while in the LAM, it was a central
experience. This means that fundamentally, there is a difference between the Fascism of Italy and
the Fascism of Romania, despite having many similar motifs.
For these reasons, it is reasonable to compare the LAM with the Falangist movement of
Spain. This movement was a highly conservative movement in Spain in the mid 1930’s, that with
the help of Francisco Franco and the Fascist powers of Europe, took power following the Spanish
Civil War of 1937. The Falangist movement had a number of distinct similarities to the LAM, not
the least of which was the role of Christianity. Bailey W. Diffie, writing during World War II,
quotes Jose Pemartin, as saying “The total Catholicization of Spain cannot be achieved without a
decided
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the regeneration of Europe, and even more specifically, of the regeneration of Spain in the sense
of the total Catholicization we envison.”169 Here, Catholicism and Fascism are treated as almost
being the same. In Spain, one cannot thrive without the other anymore. The Falangists believed
that nothing good could come of modern society, and that Fascism, a regression to the glory of the
medieval era, was what was needed.170 Further, Diffie also claims that Franco attributed his
movement to the teachings of the Catholic Church.171
If the case is that the Falangist government, was Fascist and heavily Christian, why then
would the modern far right be interested in the LAM? After all, the Falangist movement was not
only able to come to power, but retain it until 1975, outliving even its continental cousins in
Germany and Italy. There are two possibilities for a far right activist to favor the LAM to the
Falangist movement. The first is the history of anti-Catholicism being linked with white supremacy
in the United States. For a long period of time, groups, such as the KKK, have seen Catholics as a
group to keep out of America.172 One of the specific arguments used was that the Catholics had
two allegiances, one to country and one to the pope.173 In a nation like Spain, where Catholicism
has been the predominant religion for centuries, this was not a problem, as being Catholic can be
syncretized to being Spanish. However, in a nation like the United States, where this history as a
predominant religion is not present, it is much harder to find Catholicism to be a unifying factor.
Thus, the LAM, which was supported by the nationalistic Romanian Orthodox Church, becomes
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more appealing. It is not likely for Romanian Orthodoxy to be the specific religion used in the
United States, but a denomination that is similarly nationalistic would work in much the same way.
Believing that one nation did something in the right way does not preclude one from being a
nationalist of another. The same could be said for a nationalist denomination. Secondly, it is
possible that the reason why the LAM may be attractive to the modern far right is that the
background of the LAM was more against testablished authority. While the Falangist regime was
certainly opposed to the government of its day, its most well-known leader was Francisco Franco,
a general of the Spanish army. On the other hand, the LAM was founded and lead by a civilian,
Codreanu. This could serve as an inspiration to someone who may not have been permitted in the
American military, or simply did not want to serve. The belief in opposition to the established
authority is eerily similar in the LAM as it was to the modern far right.
A critical difference in the LAM compared to Nazism and Italian Fascism, was that the
LAM never gained full control over its government. This largely was because of the Legion’s
inability to take advantage of political power, their focus on the small scale in Romanian society,
and antagonism toward the established government. This antagonism led them to renounce their
opportunity to become the sole rulers of Romania, as King Carol, in June of 1940, was looking for
an ultranationalist partner after being forced to hand over Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina to
the Soviet Union. The King needed to form a new government, likely to regain public support after
a significant portion of the country to their most dangerous neighbors. Among the nationalists
selected were three Legionaries, including Codreanu’s successor, Horia Sima. However, despite
having ministerial roles in the government of Romania, they decided to resign rather than work
with the king. It was not long before the king was overthrown by Antonescu for ceding more
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territory to Hungary.174 While it is possible that this decision may have bought the LAM a few
more months, it is equally possible that the exchange would not have happened if the Legionaries
were willing to work with King Carol for the sake of advancing their goal. Zealots like the LAM
would be unlikely to freely relinquish control of territory to a neighbor, especially one that was
not as powerful as Stalin’s USSR at this point. Essentially, rather than working to subvert the royal
regime and take power when the opportunity presented it, the Legionaries decided to be romantic
martyrs and resign instead. Once members of the LAM decided to take up arms against the military
regime for the dismissal of a single minister, it became clear that the political future for the Iron
Guard was bleak.175
By virtue of the fact that all four are fascists, it is to be expected to find many similarities
between the LAM, Italian Fascists, Falangists and the Nazis. However, this is not to say that the
four movements were simply copies of one another, with the only differences being where and to
what race they catered to. Rather, the LAM can be distinguished from the other movements in the
form of its integrated youth movement, attachment to Christianity, and its disorganization and lack
of political savvy. The LAM represented a very different form of Fascism than that of the Italians
and Germans. Focusing largely on religion, it endears itself more toward the traditionalists, making
it more likely to be embraced by the older members of society, while engaging the youth to tap
into a steady supply of new recruits. This seeming contradiction was likely responsible for its
limited success, while the incompetence in politicking was the seed of its own downfall.
The LAM was at its core, a Christian fascist movement. This combination of spiritual and
national elements is one that is echoed in the present day as of the writing of this project in 2021.

174

Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 221–22.

175

Sebastian, Journal 1935–1944, 305.

66
Throughout the history of the United States, many white nationalist movements have used
Christianity as part of their platform to define what makes someone an American. 176 In this way,
there are resonant themes between the LAM and American groups, such as the KKK and any
offshoots. Therefore, a modern far-right activist may be attracted to using the LAM as a model for
how to behave politically. Due to the connection between white supremacy and Christianity in the
United States, the connection between the nationalist Romanian Orthodox Church becomes
familiar and something that is easily emulated. Because of this connection, the LAM was
something of a role model. Due to being one of the largest fascist groups in Europe, and coming
from very humble beginnings, the LAM is somehow a symbol of hope for the neofascist, showing
how much of an effect a group can have with little more than the will to change the nation through
violence.
The LAM was fundamentally a disorganized movement. The LAM, while willing to work
in Parliament did not primarily seek to use organized, traditional political methods to achieve their
goals. Their primary method of shaping the political theater of Romania was through chaotic
violence, be it the assassinations of Ion Duca and Armand Calinescu, or the Legionary Revolt in
Bucharest.177 The fact that the Nest system prevented the level of organization that would be
necessary for a larger level political force in parliament is not an accident.178 With the organization
of the movement being so centered on the ambitions of members, who were stoked by the
emotional and irrational rhetoric of the LAM, it is no wonder why they so commonly resorted to
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violence. This was the easiest way to try and exert their power on the world. Likewise in modern
far-right activists, as can be seen in the January 6th, 2021 US Capitol attack, many are easily incited
to violence with limited organization or planning. This is not to say that all members of the mob
were not planning on attacking, but there was a large number that were quick to be incited to
violence. In this way, if the far-right were to truly be this quick to incite to violence, then the LAM
would be an ideal candidate to emulate. With a similar temperament, it is reasonable that such a
group would seek to take inspiration from the LAM.
The LAM, or the Iron Guard, was a highly religiously inspired form of fascism. It drew
many supporters in its day in the limelight of Romanian politics. Unfortunately, it appears that the
appeal for such a hateful group still exists today. While the Legion itself may be consigned to the
past, for now the politically active must be careful in attempting to deal with descendants and those
inspired by the Iron Guard.
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